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I. Introduction 
	 Mobility, as defined by the World Health Organization’s International Classification of 
Function and Disability (ICF), is “moving or manipulating objects, by walking, running or climb-
ing, and by using various forms of transportation”.  Oxford introduces the concept of impair1 -
ment as “loss or abnormality of a body structure or a physiological function”.  Mobility Aids are 2
defined, by Ridolfo and Ward, as “devices that allow individuals with mobility impairments to 
be ambulatory or move around including canes, crutches, walkers, wheelchairs, scooters, 
prosthetics and braces”.  Mosby’s Medical Dictionary classifies a caregiver as “One who con3 -
tributes to the benefits of medical, social, economic or environmental resources to a depen-
dent person”.  This paper will show how people with mobility impairments use mobility aides 4
and caregivers as inputs in a production process to attain a good called mobility. It will then 
discuss some of the economy-wide efficiency issues that prevail within most social programs 
aimed at helping people with mobility impairments attain mobility.

II. Mobility Endowments, Mobility Functions and Utility 
	 The Oxford definition cited above implies that someone without a mobility impairment is 
not lacking any mobility, by virtue of having full bodily function. This paper describes such a 
person as having a complete endowment of organic mobility. Those lacking mobility, however, 
by virtue of their incipient bodily structures and functions, must top up their incomplete organic 
endowments with synthetic mobility, which means that they use caregivers and mobility aides 
to assist them in creating mobility.

Deriving a Mobility Function From a Mobility Endowment 
	 Mobility endowments, whether organic or synthetic, can be expressed mathematically 
as shown in Equation 1.

(1)	 	 

	 The mobility endowment  is therefore a sum of  terms, which describe tasks or ac-
tivities called mobility goods. A typical bundle of mobility goods might include  as a shower 
in the morning,  as getting dressed,  and brushing teeth,  as making breakfast,  as 
eating it, and so on. 
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	 The bundling of mobility goods into mobility endowments is not very interesting when 
describing someone with full bodily function. For someone lacking bodily function, each mobili-
ty good, by necessity, is a function of labor and capital. Suppose that  denotes a mobility 
endowment for such a person. 

(2)	 	 where	 ,   , and   

	 

	 Note that we have divided the mobility goods into three categories, and summed them 
to get: 



(3)	 	 

	 What is the meaning of Equations 2 and 3? This is best illustrated with an example. 
Suppose we have a mobility creator who suffers a stroke. We would proceed by computing the 
sum of mobility goods in the endowment, as is illustrated in the lines immediately following 
Equation 2. The day would begin with a shower. The caregiver would come to wake the mobili-
ty creator, and use a mechanical lift to transfer he or she into a commode shower chair. The 
caregiver would then bathe the mobility creator, and then use the mechanical lift a second time 
to transfer the creator back to bed to be dressed. The first two  terms capture the getting out 
of bed and showering goods because this employs the simultaneous use of labor and capital 
(in the form of caregivers mechanical lifts and commode chairs). The third  term denotes us-
ing the mechanical lift to put the creator back on the bed before being dressed. The first  
term denotes getting dressed, because the caregiver is not using any mechanized devices to 
put the creator’s clothes on. The  terms describe everything the creator does after they are 
in their wheelchair for the day and the caregiver leaves, like watching TV, for example.

	 The superscript terms , ,  and  are called the organic parameters. they describe the 
severity of the creator’s impairment. The smaller they are, the more severe the impairment is. 
Someone with relatively large organic parameters would require relatively small quantities of 
labor and capital to attain a desired mobility good, while someone with small organic parame-
ters would require a relatively large quantity of inputs to attain the same good. More will be said 
about these in Section IV.

Mobility Preference Functions 
	 One might wonder about the utility that mobility goods generate for a creator. A Mobility 
Preference Function is a utility function that describes utility as a function of mobility and all 
other goods, as defined by Equation 4.

(4)	 		 where	 mobility	 and  all other goods 

	 Mobility preference functions treat a mobility endowment as a sum of monetary expen-
ditures. For example, one could look at the shower-dress bundle introduced above and ex-
press it in terms of a dollar amount of labor and machine hours spent attaining it. Expressing 
these things in terms of dollars means that it is possible to compare mobility and non-mobility 
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expenditures by how much utility they generate. This paper will refer to a creator’s endowment, 
or total endowment, as the summed monetary value of all mobility and non-mobility goods 
available to them. Equation 5 expresses this mathematically, where  is the total endowment, 
 is the mobility endowment and  is the non-mobility endowment (or the all other goods 
endowment).

(5)	 

 	 Equation 5 gives rise to the concept of a composite bundle. A composite bundle is a 
collection of any mobility and non-mobility goods within a creator’s endowment.

Utility Maximization Subject to a Mobility Constraint  
Given some mobility creator with a mobility function:



And a utility function:



Utility can be expressed a composite function:



A rational, utility maximizing creator will allocate his or her composite bundle such that:

 	 thus	 	 and	 

Which reduces to:

(6)	 

	 Equation 6 says that a creator will maximize his or her utility such that the marginal utili-
ty products of mobility (the marginal utility attained from hiring one additional unit of labor and 
capital toward attaining the next mobility good) are equal to the marginal utility of all other 
goods. 

Moving Along A Mobility Preference Curve vs Moving to a Larger Endowment 
	 Suppose we have a creator who is contemplating purchasing an $8,000 electric wheel-
chair instead of continuing to use their existing $2,000 manual chair. Whether or not such a 
move is utility maximizing depends on the creator’s mobility function and the value of the pa-
rameter . If the creator finds that he or she is capable of getting around in the manual wheel-
chair without suffering any fatigue or repetitive  strain, then the use of an electric chair would 
not be mobility maximizing. the intuition here is that the shoulders are a well-functioning piece 
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of mobility creating machinery, albeit organic, that will be left underused. The electric wheel-
chair would serve to needlessly replicate a component of the creator’s productive mobility ca-
pacity. We can refer to this as the crowding out effect, where organic bodily functions are 
crowded out by the over use of synthetic inputs. In this case, the $6,000 net expenditure would 
not generate any increases in mobility, which would put the creator at a lower level of utility be-
cause the non-mobility endowment shrank.

	 However, If the creator’s mobility function was such that the electric chair reduced pain 
and inflammation caused by repetitive strain from pushing around all the time, the mobility en-
dowment would grow. If the increase in utility were enough to surpass the $6,000 cost, the cre-
ator would move to a higher level of utility. If the change in utility were exactly equal to to the 
$6,000, the creator would be indifferent, which would generate a movement along the curve.

III. Efficiency in Mobility Product Mix 
Attainment of the Pareto Set  
Let  be the set of all mobility functions of the form 

Let  be the set of all mobility preference functions of the form 

Let  be the set of all non-mobility production functions of the form 

One would expect a Pareto dominating equilibrium where:

(7)	  	 for all objects contained in 

	 Equation 7 describes an equilibrium called efficiency in mobility product mix. There is 
some unique allocation of mobility and non-mobility goods such that the ratio of marginal utili-
ties for consumers are equal to the ratio of marginal products attained in producing the two 
goods. Such an equilibrium ensures that there is no re-allocation that would improve some-
body’s endowment without reducing the endowment of somebody else. The remainder of this 
section will explain how certain provincial disability support systems in Canada interfere with 
the attainment of such an equilibrium.

inefficiencies Caused by Restrictions on Capital Allocations  
	 The provincial governments of Alberta and Ontario both have programs that use public 
funds to purchase mobility aides for creators. Alberta uses approved product lists.  Approved 5
product lists contain mobility aides specific to make and model that the agency will purchase. 
If the specific product desired by a creator is not on the list, it will not be purchased. Ontario 
does not make purchasing decisions based on make and model, but they do restrict what they 
will purchase based on the type of mobility aid (i.e. they do not fund commode chairs). The 
problem is that these policies tend to prohibit the use of a great many mobility aides that would 
generate Pareto improving moves for creators. 
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	 One example of this can be found in the exclusion of turner-transfer-aide devices from 
the Alberta Aides to Daily Living (AADL) program. Turner-transfer-aides work well for creators 
who posses enough organic mobility to stand up autonomously, but cannot pivot their body 
while standing to enable movement from surface to surface. The only other option available is a 
ceiling track lift, which lifts the entire body from surface yo surface. Use of such a device would 
not be mobility maximizing because it would crowd out the use of the creator’s legs. A lift 
might cost $2,000. A turner-transfer-aide costs $1,000. Just like in the preceding example, an 
additional net expenditure on mobility capital ($1,000 more to use a lift over a turner) does not 
cause the mobility endowment to grow, resulting in a reduced endowment.   

	 One reason why Alberta uses approved product lists instead of restricting purchases by 
type is because AADL recycles all of the equipment they purchase. Difficulties arise with turner-
transfer-aides because relatively few people use them. Most people who possess the organic 
mobility to stand autonomously can also shift their weight well enough using a ceiling mounted 
poll. This creates difficulties in finding another user for the  device in the event that the user it 
was purchased for no longer needs it. The Ontario Assistive Devices Program (OADP) does not 
recycle mobility aides; users can apply for new equipment every so many years, and keep the 
old stuff. This greatly reduces the demand for used equipment, resulting a surplus of mobility 
capital. Markets are good at resolving such inefficiencies. If mobility creators were simply given 
a monetary endowment to spend as they saw fit, they would simply buy whatever mobility aide 
that enriched their endowment most.

Inefficiencies Caused by Restrictions on Labor Allocations 
	 Another source of inefficiency prevails in home care support programs that allow mobili-
ty creators to hire caregivers. Sadly, the funds provided don’t offer enough flexibility for house-
holds to make productivity maximizing allocations. Many households with mobility creators 
face a demand for micro-allocations. A micro-allocation is a very tiny use of labor employed to 
attain a mobility good that would otherwise be done autonomously. Suppose a creator is 
watching TV and drops the remote. They might ask a member of their household to pick it up. 
In the absence of someone to do so, a creator is often left with a reduced endowment because 
the alternatives tend to be energy consuming. A reaching devise, for example, might weigh up 
to five pounds, at it often takes two or three attempts at lifting it before success. This would 
shrink most creator’s endowments because daily stamina is often very finite

	 Micro-allocations tend to be disruptive to the completion of other domestic tasks, like 
housecleaning and laundry, because of the interruptions they impose. If households were given 
the freedom to outsource these tasks instead, the result would be a more structured division of 
labour that would boost productivity. Surely it would be more productive for one labourer to 
focus on mobility creation, and another to the day-to-day chores of the household, instead of 
putting mobility creation solely in the hands of the fixed schedules of third parties, which leaves 
family members having to play both roles when the paid caregiver leaves.

	 One commonly cited reason for the reluctance of governments to allow monetary com-
pensation for family caregivers is that it exacerbates the vulnerability of mobility creators within 
families; family members would have an incentive to spend less of the money on supports and 
more on luxury goods, for example. 

IV. Inter-temporal Mobility Creation and the Pareto Set 
Inter-temporal Mobility Functions 
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	 Suppose a mobility creator were to enrol in a physical rehabilitation program that im-
proved his or her organic mobility. The pre-rehab period will be denoted as  and the post re-
hab period as .

	 In period the creator may notice significant changes in things like muscle pain and fa-
tigue, by virtue of having better bodily function. The creator might find that he or she can toler-
ate longer intervals of sitting upright, before having to take a break and lay down. This means 
that the creator now has access to more mobility goods. There is more time to be spent upright 
and mobile. Additionally, the creator may be strong enough to transfer into their commode us-
ing a wall mounted pole instead of a lift. The net result is a simultaneous increase in the cre-
ator’s the mobility and non-mobility endowments.

	 Such changes can be shown in the creator’s mobility function by treating the coeffi-
cients and organic parameters as functions of . In this case, everything is a positive function of 
; the increase in the number of mobility goods results in larger coefficients, and the fact that 
less is being devoted to capital expenditure for the same bundle means that organic parame-
ters have increased. 

(8)	 	 

	 Equation 8 is an example of an inter-temporal mobility function. Wherever there is an 
increase in organic mobility, the endowment coefficients and organic parameters are positive 
functions of time. Wherever there is a decrease in organic mobility, the organic parameters and 
endowment coefficients are negative functions of time.

Type 1 and Type 2 Mobility Functions 
	 

Mobility functions of the form expressed in Equation 6 can be classified into two types, based 
on the function’s derivative with respect to .

	 	 

	 

If ,  is a Type 1 mobility function

If ,  is a Type 2 mobility function

Where  is the rehabilitation rate, or r-rate.	  

	 The absolute value of the rehabilitation rate tells us about the severity of the mobility 
impairment over time. A mobility creator with Multiple Sclerosis (MS) would have an r-rate that 
is farther away from zero than a mobility creator with Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS) be-
cause ALS is far more aggressive in its progression over time. Somebody with a spinal cord 
injury would have an r-rate close to zero because their organic mobility does not change over 
time. Somebody with an anoxic brain injury (Cerebral Palsy or Stroke) would have a positive r-
rate because they can sometimes develop new motor-neural pathways that modestly enrich 
their organic mobility in the long-run. Type 1 mobility functions describe impairments that stay 
the same or improve over time, while Type 2 ones describe impairments that worsen over time. 
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Inter-temporal Mobility Preference Functions 
Recall from Section II that a mobility preference curve was defined as 



And that a total endowment was defined as

 

	 

	 The derivation of the inter-temporal mobility function has shown that  is a function of 
time, which means that   is too, because of the endowment identity from Equation 5



The inter-temporal mobility function thus becomes:

(8)	 

The inter-temporal unity maximization criterion becomes:

(9)	 	 	 	 

	 A mobility creator will maximize inter-temporal utility by choosing an allocation such 
that the marginal utilities of mobility and all other goods with respect to time are the same. if 
time preferences are taken into account, the present value of the marginal utilities being the 
same would maximize utility. Some creators, for example, might have stronger preferences for 
current endowments when it comes to non-mobility goods, compared to those of mobility 
goods.

An Example 
	 Suppose a Type 1 creator, who was a full-time electric wheelchair user, were to enter a 
rehabilitation program. After a few months of therapy, the creator might find that he or she has 
better hand function; they can put dishes away faster, and put on their coat on with less overall 
strain and fatigue. As wonderful as such improvements are, the creator would find that the 
electric wheelchair is problematic because it is so high off the ground that they cannot reach 
the floor to pick things up. One solution would be to buy a customized manual wheelchair to 
use indoors and for short distances outdoors.

	 The manual chair would yield many advantages beyond retrieving dropped items. The 
creator would have an easier time cooking because the lower chair would enable better stove 
access. The creator could get in and out of bed autonomously because it is much easier to 
move a manual wheelchair into a safe position, while sitting on the edge of a bed, compared to 
an electric; there is no joystick that is difficult to reach that must be used to move it. They can 
simply push the chair to wherever it is needed. The creator would weigh the present value of 
the additional future utility brought on by the chair against the cost of purchasing it today.

	 Upon trialing the new chair, the creator may form an expectation that they could go to 
bed autonomously if they were to continue rehab for a while in the new chair. This expectation 
is based on the fact that transferring in and out of bed can be done much more safely in the 
new chair. Once this is mastered, all one has to do is undress themselves to displace a care-
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giver. Given that the rehab has already generated improvements in putting on one’s coat, it is 
perhaps reasonable to think that further gains in the area of undressing ought to happen. Sup-
pose the wheelchair costs $6,000 and one year of rehab costs $3,000. After one year, the cre-
ator, having mastered the going to bed and undressing autonomously, does not need the addi-
tional one hour of caregiver time every night - at a cost of $25 per hour. This forgone expendi-
ture generates $9,000 in annualized savings.

	 In this example, the creator spent $9,000 on the new wheelchair and one year of rehab 
in period  and was able to re-capture the $9,000 in forgone mobility expenditures in period , 
and all other subsequent periods. The creator also gets to enjoy an enriched mobility endow-
ment where they can cook things easier and retrieve dropped items. 

	 Such inter-temporal mobility improvements are difficult to attain because endowments 
aren’t flexible enough to allow for changes in spending behaviour over time. Because care-
givers and mobility aides are funded by different agencies with their own budgets, it would be 
impossible to spend less money on caregivers and keep that money to re-coup the costs of a 
new wheelchair. Furthermore, if the creator lived in Alberta, AADL would take the electric 
wheelchair away upon the arrival of the manual chair, because they only provide funding for 
one day-use chair. The loss of the electric wheelchair, for many creators, would result in so 
much fatigue and repetitive strain from having to push around everywhere that it would likely 
lead to a long-run reduction in total endowment.

  	 If creators were simply given an annual monetary endowment to spend on mobility and 
all other goods, where the size of the endowment were contingent on the severity of the im-
pairment, it would be much easier for them to save their money in one period to pay for more 
mobility expenditures in future periods. Another solution would be to create a financial instru-
ment that would allow creators to borrow against the value of future savings so that they can 
spend more money re-tooling their mobility functions today. Under the current system, where 
reduced caregiver expenditures do not go back to the creators who innovate, there is a greatly 
reduced incentive for creators to explore new techniques of creating mobility.

The Independence Premium 
	 Suppose, in our preceding example, that the creator saw no mobility endowment 
growth at all resulting from the new chair and the rehab. That is, he or she was not any better 
at cooking or retrieving things than before, and the only real benefit was the ability to go to bed 
autonomously, without the use of a caregiver. It would still be expected that the creator would 
get the new chair because of the future mobility expenditure savings induced by reduced care-
giver use.

	 Suppose now that going to bed autonomously induced some fatigue for the creator. 
Suppose that the creator saw a reduction in mobility endowment that caused a loss of utility 
that was exactly equal to the present value of all the future income streams captured by the 
new methods. Would the creator still be enticed to buy the new chair? The answer would de-
pend on the size of the creator’s independence premium. An independence premium is a cost 
that a creator is willing to absorb, often associated with altering one’s mobility function, when 
there is no endowment growth to offset it. For example, in the latter scenario where the reduc-
tion in mobility is exactly equal to the monetary value of the reduced expenditures, the creator 
would have no independence premium if he or she were indifferent between the new au-
tonomous method or the old. However, if the creator expressed preferences toward buying the 
chair and doing the rehab, this would reflect an independence premium. The amount of time 
and effort that goes into the re-tooling of the production function is the premium that is being 
paid for the privilege of doing things on one’s own

t0 t1
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Comparative Statics with the Inter-temporal Mobility Model  
	 Suppose a provincial government were to implement a new publicly funded physiother-
apy program across a population of Type 1 mobility creators. Like before, we will denote the 
pre-therapy period  and the post-therapy period .

Let  be the set of all Type 1 mobility functions in period  of the form:



We would expect an equilibrium  of the form:



Let  be the set of all Type 1 mobility functions in period  of the form:



We would expect an equilibrium  of the form:



	 Does  Pareto dominate ? The answer is yes. In the previous two examples, it was 
shown that the creator’s endowments grew because the monetary value of forgone mobility 
expenditures and more mobility goods was greater than or equal to the cost of acquiring more 
organic mobility. Therefore, if a population of Type 1 creators are given access to rehabilitation, 
each individual will see an increase in his or her endowment, either in the form of reduced mo-
bility expenditures, greater mobility goods, or both. The creator will continue spending on re-
habilitation until such time that the additional utility generated by the mobility gains are less 
than the forgone utility of the enrolment fees had they been spent elsewhere.    

	 The same maximization rule is also 2 across Type 2 populations. A Type 2 mobility cre-
ator might decide, under the care of a physician, to take a prescribed drug that helps to slow 
the pace of degeneration. The creator would continue taking the drug until such time that the 
loss of utility associated with the mobility endowment is equal to the forgone utility in all other 
goods induced by  taking the drug.

	 Type 1 and Type 2 mobility creators will therefore simultaneously maximize their total 
endowments by adopting mobility expenditures that will generate future endowment growth, 
resulting in long-run Pareto dominant equilibria.   

(10)	 As 	  	 where Pareto dominates . 
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	 The intuition behind Equation 10 is simple. An economy where no individuals had any 
mobility impairments would Pareto dominate one where some people did. In the latter sce-
nario, everyone’s total endowment would be larger because they would not have to devote any 
purchasing power toward mobility creation; the body’s organic structures would naturally gen-
erate all the mobility needed, which is tantamount to having an infinitely large mobility endow-
ment. Therefore, any equilibria where there is more functional organic mobility to displace the 
synthetic Is Pareto dominant.

	 	 	 	 	 	  

Policy Induced Barriers to Efficiency 
	 The Canadian social safety net is somewhat better equipped to care for Type 2 creators 
compared to Type 1’s because Pharmaceuticals are more ubiquitously available than rehabilita-
tion programs. While rehabilitation is available in paediatric populations, and when an adult be-
comes newly disabled, they tend not to be as widely available for adult Type 1 creators with a 
stable prognosis. The result is an outcome where the Type 2 creators attain an equilibria that is 
far closer to the Pareto dominating long-run one than than Type 1 populations. 

	 One explanation for this is what disability commentator Jim Mansell calls “the rise of 
market forces” fuelling such policy decisions.  Mansell argues that the rise of taxpayer centric 6
decision making on healthcare and social programs has led to a doctrine where mobility cre-
ators are given just the bare minimum level of support required for their immediate survival. 
Because the pharmaceutical products available to Type 2 creators is ultimately a life extending 
therapy, they are deemed essential. Physiotherapy interventions, on the other hand, are not. 
The real tragedy here is the long-run loss of efficiency prevailing in adult Type 1 populations. 
There are a great many such individuals that could be capturing substantial savings in forgone 
mobility expenditures tomorrow if they had access to a more diverse pool of interventions to-
day.   

V. Accessibility and Incentive Compatibility 
	 This section will add one final layer to the model thus far. It will discuss what happens 
to the behaviour of mobility creators, and consequently the Pareto Set, when society starts 
making things accessible in the community. 

Demand for Accessibility  
	 Suppose we have a creator with a mobility preference function:	  

	 In a society where nothing were made accessible (i.e. not cut curbs to allow wheel-
chairs onto sidewalks, no elevators to use in lieu of stairs, no accessible washrooms) the cre-
ator’s utility would be constrained a great deal. Once their caregiver leaves after the shower 
dress routine is done in the morning, the creator would not be able to go out and do anything; 
they could not drive their wheelchair to the drugstore, or take a bus to the mall. In this case 
their would be a reduced utility associated with all mobility and non-mobility goods. Having 
more money is meaningless if one cannot go out to spend it. Having more hours in a day sitting 
upright doesn’t mean as much if you must spend them inside your house. 

U(M, A) = MϕA1−ϕ
 Jim Mansell, “Deinstitutionalization and Community Living: Progress, Problems and 6
Priorities,” Journal of Intellectual and Developmental Disability vol. 31, no. 2 (2006): 65-76. 
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	 An outcome where things are accessible Pareto dominates one where things are not; all 
mobility creators are now attaining a higher level of utility by going out into their communities.

	 We will cal the initial Pareto set where noting is accessible , and the dominant one 
with accessibility . Unfortunately,  will only Pareto dominate  when there are no costs 
associated will re-tooling all of society’s infrastructure, transportation and buildings to make 
them accessible. is often difficult to attain for this reason.

Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency and the Problem of Cost 
	 Markets are not very good at ensuring accessibility because  creators cannot transact 
with business owners very efficiently. It would be very difficult for a single business owner to 
ask 10,000 mobility creators to each give he or she 1 dollar to pay for an elevator to be in-
stalled. Such transaction costs would be very high to do this for every building and the free-
rider problem would limit the frequency of success with such initiatives.

	  Under such conditions where transactions cannot generate socially efficient outcomes, 
the next best thing is to strive for Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. Kaldor-Hcks efficiency says that wel-
fare maximizing outcomes will be attained when the total social benefit of something exceeds 
the total cost. To determine if making communities accessible is welfare maximizing, one must 
determine if the total social benefit (the increase in utility for all the creators going out) is out-
weighed by the cost of installing elevators, modifying sidewalks and so on.

Modelling the Costs and Benefits 
	 We will adopt a new parameter , called the Relative Accessibility Multiplier. This multi-
plier, defined between  and , is an approximate proportion of how many things in a given 
community are accessible relative to the total. Therefore, by integrating a mobility preference 
function with respect to  we get: 

	 

(11)	 	 	 	 where 

	 

	 Equation 12 says that the utility attained by any given creator is a scalar multiple of the 
relative level of community accessibility. 

Let  be the set of all functions   where  

Let be the set of all functions  where 

The total social benefit of transforming the infrastructure in a community from minimally acces-
sible  to highly accessible  is thus:

 
	 Equation 13 generalizes this result, and then discounts the resulting utility change to 
account for the fact that the utility gains generated will continue into future periods.

𝕌
𝕌 * 𝕌 * 𝕌
𝕌 *
ρ
0 1
ρ
U = MϕA1−ϕ ∫
1
0
Udρ = ρMϕA1−ϕ
U(M, A) = ρMϕA1−ϕ 0 > ρ ≥ 1
𝕌 U = ρMϕA1−ϕ ρ = 0.1
𝕌 * U = ρMϕA1−ϕ ρ = 0.99
𝕌0.1 𝕌0.99
∫
0.99
0.1
𝕌dρ = 0.99MϕA1−ϕ − 0.1MϕA1−ϕ
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(12)	 	 	 	 	 

	 Equation 14 shows the  marginal cost relationship corresponding to the total cost one 
above. The idea is that policymakers will adopt accessibility expenditures such that the mar-
ginal cost of each additional project is equal to the present value of the utility gains it gener-
ates. 

(13)	 	 	 	 	 	 

	 Equation 15 shows that the marginal cost of an accessibility expenditure can approach 
zero, as can its corresponding utility. One example of this would be the installation of a small 
wooden ramp used to scale an obstacle of two inches at a local storefront. In relative terms, 
this could be interpreted as an infinitesimally small expenditure.

	 	 

	 Let 	

(14)	 	 	 	 

	 A municipality might, for example, determine that it is Kaldor-Hicks improving to make 
the city’s sidewalks and subway cars accessible because their relatively high use guarantees 
that enough creators will use them and hence the cost will be offset. They would not spend 
public money on making bars and restaurants accessible because the marginal cost of reno-
vating each building would exceed the relatively small gains in utility that each renovation 
would generate. The decision of whether or not to make such renovations falls on the individual 
proprietor. Many such establishments tend not to be accessible because the costs associated 
with becoming accessible are not offset by very much increase in overall profit that result from 
accessibility.

	 The resulting system of fragmented accessibility is a source of great uncertainty for cre-
ators. Buildings that are constructed after the municipality’s building codes were updated are 
accessible, but ones that were constructed under the outdated codes that did not prioritize ac-
cessibility are not. The alternative is to build communities that adopt homogenous accessibility, 
which more public money is spent to make everything accessible, as has been done in the 
United States,  
7
Inefficiencies Induced by Fragmentation  
	 Suppose a creator were trying to decide if he or she should spend money on a cus-
tomized wheelchair that would make it easier to navigate curbs and sidewalks, or get under 
low tables at restaurants. If there were a great deal of uncertainty with respect to how many 
places were accessible that the wheelchair could be used at, and how much one would even 
enjoy frequenting these places, would the purchase still be worthwhile?

∫
b
a
𝕌dρ = TC |ba PV(ρMϕA1−ϕ) |
b
a = TC |
b
a
ΔU = MC PV(ΔU ) = MC
b − a = h
lim
h→0 ∫
a+h
a
𝕌dρ = MC PV( lim
h→0 ∫
a+h
a
𝕌dρ) = MC
 Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Public Law 101-336, 108th Congress, 2nd session 7
(July 26, 1990).
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	 The information costs that such things impose on creators would likely have some 
bearing on their decisions of input choice. The status quo bias , when applied in this context, 8
predicts that creators would be more likely to keep their current input choice the same instead 
of purchasing new equipment. Recall from Equation 6 

that creators maximize their short-term utility such that .

	 In the presence of fragmentation, the additional information costs imposed on creators 
could be such that they never realize their maximum level of utility. As an intrinsic consequence 
of this behaviour, one could expect that a population of creators may never attain the Pareto 

set induced by the equilibrium   .

Analogously, recall from Equation 9, that in the long-run creators maximize utility such that

.

	 A creator deciding whether or not to enrol in a physiotherapy program with the goal of 
displacing the need for a caregiver in the evening, for example, would struggle with the same 
informational burdens. If it were difficult to determine which places were accessible, and hence 
where one could spend one’s evenings, would the time, money and effort required to displace 
the caregiver and come home whenever one wanted really be worth it? 

	 Just like in the short-run, such systemic uncertainty across a population would thus 

make the Pareto set induced by the equilibrium  difficult to attain.

	 This loss of surplus induced by fragmentation will be called residual inefficiency denot-
ed as . The new welfare maximization criterion, under fragmentation, thus becomes: 

(15)	 

VI. Labor Supply and Mobility Creation 
	 Thus far, this paper has assumed zero labor force participation by mobility creators. 
This section will relax that assumption, and show how mobility creation affects labor supply 
decisions for creators participating in the labor force. 

∂U
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= ∂U
∂L
= ∂U
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=
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∂K
∂A
∂K
∂U
∂M
∂M
∂t
= ∂U
∂A
∂A
∂t
E *
∂U
∂M
∂U
∂A
=
∂M
∂L *
∂A
∂L
=
∂M
∂K *
∂A
∂K
R
∫
b
a
𝕌dρ = TC |ba + R
 William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser, “Status Quo Bias in Decision Making” Journal of 8
Risk Uncertainty, vol. 1 (1988) 7-59.
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The Consumption, Leisure and Mobility Trade-Off 
	 A mobility creator must decide how much time he or she is willing to spend on mobility 
creation in the short-term, perhaps a 16 hour day, for example. Of those 16 hours, some will be 
devoted to mobility creation , and the rest will be devoted to non-mobility goods, or all other 
goods . Mobility is a function of consumption , and time . All other goods is a function of 
consumption , and leisure . One can now construct a more sophisticated utility function of 
the form:

(16)	 	     

A creator will maximize utility by selecting some value of  such that 

VII. Conclusions 
	 This paper has shown that there are allocations that mobility creators could make in the 
short-run that would be Pareto improving, if they were given fewer constraints with their input 
choices. It has also shown that inter-temporal mobility creation results in mobility functions that 
are highly fluid, with parameters that can change in the long-run.

	 Thus, welfare maximizing policies are ones that seek to relax constraints on input 
choice so that the Pareto set can be attained in the short-run. In the long-run, creators must be 
given more freedom so that they can alter their mobility expenditures today in order to grow 
their endowments in the future.	 

	 These outcomes will be difficult to accomplish with fragmented accessibility and a 
patchwork of autonomously funded and managed services (i.e. one agency for caregiver provi-
sion, another for mobility aide purchases) and so on. Mobility creators need a fungible endow-
ment that they can spend as they see fit, where the goal will be to minimize uncertainty and 
encourage creators to attain the highest level of mobility they can, subject to the severity of 
their impairment and the level of monetary support that society is comfortable giving them. 
Such a model can only exist if there is an abandonment of the doctrine that supports for the 
mobility impaired must only enrich mobility endowments. It will also require an abandonment of 
the idea that everything need not be accessible in society. 

	 What is mobility? Mobility is the universal facilitator, the universal compliment, that en-
ables the consumption of every and all good or service, either in the form of functioning bodily 
structures, or synthetic inputs. A good disability support system, therefore, is one which en-
sures that as few of society’s resources are devoted to facilitating consumption so that the rest 
of all that remains can be consumed to the fullest.The only true way to accomplish this is to let 
self-interested mobility creators try things with the resources of their own endowments and en-
joy the fruits of their experiments. 

	 

M
A c t
c l
U(M, A) = M(c(t), t), A(c(t), l(t))
t
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